Işıl Kurnaz
Can the refusal of 1-day reserve military service be interpreted in a way that expands the right to conscientious objection? The ECHR's most recent judgment on conscientious objection, Kanatlı v. Türkiye, dated March 2024, attempts to answer this question by considering the right to conscientious objection as part of a broad conscientious objection movement. In this study, I will try to address this judgment from a perspective that expands on the ECHR's previous jurisprudence. I will try to understand how the ECHR's recent judgment affects the scope and internal limits of the right. My main question is whether there is right to conscientious objection even in cases where compulsory military service imposes a negligible obligation on the individual in terms of time and content. In other words, can the right to conscientious objection be defended even when the criteria of constitutional and personal importance are not met? I will also try to show how, in this case, not only Article 9, but also the right of access to a court under Article 6 has been violated. This is because, although the low fines and short-term prison sentences imposed by states for non-compliance with compulsory military service indicate that the violation of the obligation is met with a negligible sanction by the state, there is also a strategic approach by states that prevents access to the right to a fair trial. In this article, the right to conscientious objection is not a right of individual over society, but rather a social movement in a society which abolish the dichotomy of society v. individual on the conscientious objection.
